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INTRODUCTION: SYMPOSIUM ON
LAWYERS’ SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
AS PUBLIC CITIZENS IN A RAPIDLY
CHANGING WORLD
SUSAN D. CARLE*
The following presentations represent the Professional Responsibility
Section Program at the Association of American Law Schools Annual
Meeting on January 7, 2011. The members of the program planning
committee were Sande Buhai, of Loyola Law School in Los Angeles;
Margaret Raymond, of University of Iowa College of Law; Jack Sahl, of
University of Akron, C. Blake McDowell Law Center; and myself, Susan
D. Carle. All members of the planning committee put their stamp on the
program in important ways.
The program topic was intended to create a focus on how lawyers’
special responsibilities for the quality of justice in our society are
undergoing new challenges in the face of many new influences on the legal
profession. We recognized that recent world events have led to enormous
new pressures on, and potential transformations in, conventional
understandings of lawyers’ professional responsibilities. The worldwide
economic crisis and its causal link to financial practices in which some
lawyers were complicit, coupled with lawyers’ roles in a host of recent
corporate scandals, have shifted attention back to lawyers’ professional
responsibilities to safeguard the public purposes of regulatory law. The
challenge of combating terrorism while preserving treasured lawyering
traditions that protect individual civil liberties against state encroachment
has raised difficult new dilemmas. Persisting economic and social
inequalities continue to pose a host of questions about lawyers’ special
responsibilities, if any, to work for social justice.
At the same time, globalization has led to increased linkages among
lawyers as well as increasing competitive pressures and new experiments in
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legal services arrangements. All of these new issues confronting lawyers in
a rapidly changing world raise important questions about how we should
teach new generations of lawyers to assume their places in the legal
profession as special citizens with potentially unique duties as guardians of
justice.
These were the general questions we set out to address. More
realistically, we at least hoped to reach a subset of such questions through
this program. We initially scheduled, as one of our speakers, a military
JAG lawyer involved in the representation of detainees in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, but she unfortunately had to withdraw at the last minute,
leading the presentations below to skew more towards civil representation
than we had originally planned. But losing one planned aspect of the
program left more room for the remaining presenters to go into depth on
their topics, so our loss in one respect led to gains in others.
Planning the program turned out to be a very organic process, and the
presentations have come together in interesting and telling ways. The
common themes that unite them were not necessarily similarities we were
striving to achieve, making it all the more striking that the presentations
exhibit certain shared qualities which, as I will argue below, demonstrate
something important about how scholarship in the professional
responsibility field is developing. Before discussing the similarities that
span the presenters’ diverse topics, I will offer a few words about each of
the presenters and the theses they so admirably develop in the short space
allotted for each of their presentations.
William H. Simon is the Arthur Levitt Professor of Law and the Everett
B. Birch Professor in Professional Responsibility at Columbia Law School,
as well as the William W. and Gertrude H. Saunders Professor of Law at
Stanford Law School. Professor Simon hardly needs any introduction to
anyone who follows professional responsibility scholarship. He is a
prolific scholar in professional responsibility as well as social policy and
welfare rights law. I value him as one of the scholars that most influenced
my thinking when I first started studying the field of legal ethics. He has
taken on old jeremiads and challenged others in the field in a broad range
of ways. Although it might not always be comfortable to hear what
Professor Simon has to say, it is always very worthwhile, and I am
extremely appreciative that he was willing to prepare his interesting new
paper for this program.
Professor Simon’s paper compares recent developments in ethics
regulation across the securities and tax areas. He is interested in the
contrast between the responses of the bars in these two areas of practice to
what he calls the “gatekeeper” idea—in other words, the idea that lawyers
should attend to the public interest in their representation of their clients.
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Simon sees interesting differences in the two bars’ reactions to new
regulations in both practice areas that enhance lawyers’ gatekeeping
responsibilities.
In the securities area, the main new regulatory
development involves the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
promulgation of new regulations under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Simon
shows that the securities bar has resisted these developments. It has done
so through a variety of means ranging from displaying ambivalence to
mounting outright opposition to the imposition of new responsibilities,
even when these responsibilities have been modest and not very different
from what existing doctrine already provides.
In the tax practice area, the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) new
regulations, known as Circular 230, have raised the requirements for the
threshold level of merit a tax lawyer’s legal position on behalf of a client
must have. These regulations elevate this standard considerably above that
required by Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 3.1, entitled
“Meritorious Claims and Contentions.” These new rules are far more
drastic than those applying to securities lawyers, but in contrast to the
securities bar, the tax bar has not exhibited the strong resistance that has
characterized the securities bar’s reaction. In fact, some prominent tax
practitioners have even embraced and encouraged these developments.
Simon proposes three possible explanations for these observed
differences. First, what he calls a “functional approach” might posit that
the difference can be accounted for by the fact that tax enforcement
depends on an understaffed state agency, the IRS, whereas securities law
enforcement does not depend solely on agency enforcement but also
benefits from the vigilance of investment bankers and an active plaintiffs’
bar representing investors. Thus, Simon implies, tax lawyers sense the
need to assume more of a gatekeeping role in order to preserve the proper
functioning of the tax law system, whereas securities lawyers have faith in
the adversarial system to expose legal wrongdoing.
Simon’s second potential explanation looks to history and points out a
longstanding tradition within the elite tax bar of embracing the gatekeeping
role, but presumably, no such similar tradition within the securities bar.
Finally, Simon offers as a third possible explanation, a political one, which
points to a difference between the competitive situations of securities and
tax lawyers. “Barriers to entry” for tax practice are fairly low, but are
higher for securities law. Elite tax practitioners, thus, may have more cause
to worry about a “race to the bottom” as aggressive upstarts take
unprincipled legal positions in order to attract clients.
In sum, Simon’s explanation rests on the idea that analyzing structural
differences between different practice locations may help account for
developments within the profession as well as different reactions among
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different sectors of the bar to regulation of the profession. Simon’s thesis
is brilliant and provocative and will surely merit far more development and
debate. His underlying theme is one I want to revisit after introducing and
summarizing the other presenters’ arguments.
The second presentation published here is that of Scott Cummings of
UCLA School of Law, another person who stands out for how much he has
taught legal ethics scholars about what is actually happening on the ground,
especially in the field closest to my heart—namely, public interest or social
change law, cause lawyering, representing the underrepresented, or
whatever else you might want to call it. Scott has been the leading voice
capturing, interpreting, and explaining this sector of the legal profession for
many years now. He is currently a Professor of Law and faculty chair of
the Epstein Program in Public Interest Law and Policy at UCLA Law
School. His publications go on for many pages, as does the list of courses
he teaches, and he has several new books in the works as well.
Professor Cummings’s presentation empirically examines the provision
of public interest law within the private for-profit sector.
More
specifically, Professor Cummings looks at two practice arrangements of
this type. The first type involves the carrying out of pro bono work by law
firms that, in the main area of their practice, generate income through feefor-service arrangements with clients who can pay for their legal work.
The second type involves private, public interest law firms that do some
fee-for-service work in order to fund public interest work, which they see
as a primary mission of their firm, and/or do public interest work for clients
who do not pay but for which the firm hopes to receive court-ordered
attorneys’ fees.
Cummings’s goal is to examine what kinds of legal services needs get
taken care of through these two types of private-sector legal services
delivery models. He starts by pointing out that, although generally the
private sector is viewed warily as a potential substitute for “good-oldfashioned” non-profit public interest offices, this kind of thinking can block
a more level-headed approach to determining how to target scarce public
resources to take care of the most pressing uncovered needs.
Cummings’s fascinating conclusions are tentative; he is most confident
about what the empirical data shows with respect to pro bono legal
services. Cummings finds that those with power in law firms dictate the
pro bono agenda. These “persons with power” are, naturally enough,
partners and associates. The key factors they consider involve, first,
sensitivity to fee-paying clients’ interests and reactions, and second,
choosing work that helps with recruiting and professional development of
the firms’ lawyers. Here, I think of a former student of mine who once
sought a Skadden fellowship to represent in-home domestic and childcare
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workers in securing greater legal protections against their employers. She
described the gradually dawning shock, and then horror, that came over the
faces of the lawyers interviewing her as it dawned on them that what she
was seeking to do was to represent the very workers in these lawyers’
homes who were taking care of matters on the domestic front so they could
put in their long, lucrative hours at the law firm. She did not, needless to
say, get the fellowship; though, she has since gone on to a highly illustrious
career in public interest law. In other words, law firm pro bono work
certainly can fill some legal needs, but it will just as certainly leave
important gaps where legal needs clash with the interests of the clients and
lawyers associated with those firms.
Cummings’s conclusions about private public interest law are equally
interesting. His tentative data points to a greater concentration of such
firms in “blue” states and in areas covered by fee-shifting statues and
public defense subsidies—in other words, in contexts in which prevailing
ideology, law, and taxpayer-provided resources encourage certain kinds of
legal representation as a matter of public policy. These are revealing
conclusions, suggesting possible future experiments in how to engineer
outcomes through the establishment of market-type incentives to produce
services in badly needed areas of legal representation. For example, might
one want to consider new fee-shifting or fee-provision statutes to cover the
representation of persons about to lose their homes in mortgage foreclosure
cases?
In short, here, as in Simon’s presentation, Cummings’s project involves a
highly sophisticated effort to explain empirically observed phenomena
relating to the relationship between different sectors of legal practice;
Cummings further explores what these findings mean for the functioning of
the American legal system’s justice-seeking goals.
Similar themes dominate the third presenter’s project, which
concentrates on a very different sector of the legal profession—namely, the
somewhat obscure legal services sector of high volume, settlement-oriented
representation of lower-income clients with little familiarity with the legal
profession. This is the subject of Nora Freeman Engstrom’s uniquely
creative and path-breaking project.
Professor Engstrom represents a more recent entrant into law teaching,
having joined the faculty of Stanford Law School in 2009 after a career in
practice as an associate at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and as a research
dean’s scholar at Georgetown University Law Center. Professor Engstrom
has already published a number of articles that raise highly interesting
matters of professional responsibility to which scholars have thus far paid
little attention, including such topics, previously considered rather
mundane, as automobile accident lawyering, the workings of no-fault
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insurance, low-value personal injury cases, and settlement mills.
As do Simon and Cummings, Engstrom challenges commonly accepted
understandings about how professional responsibility rules currently do, or
should, shape the nature of what is taking place in the “real world” of law
practice. The common assumption Engstrom questions is that, although
our justice system suffers from a large problem of two tiers of justice—i.e.,
“one for the haves and one for the have-nots”—in almost all practice areas,
an exception exists in the personal injury realm due to the wide use of
contingency fee arrangements along with loosened restrictions on lawyer
advertising. Observers have believed that these factors produce better or
more equal legal representation for clients in personal injury cases.
Engstrom’s fascinating study of the little-understood phenomenon of law
firms that operate as settlement mills—in other words, by Engstrom’s
definition, firms that generate extremely high rates of case settlements after
very little contact with the clients and facts involved—suggests that our
assumptions about the working of the legal system in personal injury cases
may be quite wrong. Engstrom’s findings suggest that even with the
incentives contingency fees offer, and even with the access to information
about lawyers advertising provides, the most vulnerable and
unsophisticated clients in our legal system may still be receiving quite
problematic representation. They are still suffering from “a lack of
information concerning rights and potential remedies and also a lack of
knowledge about, and contact with, lawyers.”
Yet again, Engstrom’s project returns to questions about class status,
among both lawyers and clients, as a causal factor in explaining what
happens in the provision of justice in the American legal system. Her
project both provocatively and convincingly reminds that we must remain
vigilant in empirically assessing what is actually happening “out there.”
Like Cummings’s similarly probing investigation, Engstrom’s project
heightens our awareness of the need to look with fresh eyes at how best to
improve the quality of justice in the United States.
The fourth and final presenter, Rob Vischer from the University of St.
Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis, carries the distinction of having
had his paper selected by the program committee through an anonymously
judged call for papers last summer. Professor Vischer’s presentation takes
us full circle from the domestic corporate and tax lawyers on which
Professor Simon focuses; through the private sector, public interest lawyers
in various practice arrangements on which Professor Cummings focuses
and the private-sector, low status personal injury lawyers representing
clients who know little about the legal system, whom Professor Engstrom
is studying; back to the world of “big law”—this time thought about
transnationally, on the broadest of geographical scales, but at the same time
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quite minutely focused on the fragile “trust” elements of the lawyer-client
relationship.
Professor Vischer, like the other panelists, has a very distinguished
record of publications that stretches for pages. He is also a very active
blogger in the legal ethics area, as many may know. His new book just out
from Cambridge University Press is entitled Conscience and the Common
Good: Reclaiming the Space Between Person and State. Based on how
beautifully written and conceived his panel paper is, I know I will buy this
book, as undoubtedly will many others after reading his excellent
presentation.
Vischer’s thesis follows the theme of this symposium, considering
lawyers’ special responsibilities as public citizens by focusing on the
special trust element of a lawyer’s relationship with a client. This element,
Vischer points out, does not necessarily exist, or even ideally need to exist,
with respect to technical service providers of many other kinds. But,
Vischer queries, does the weakening of relational trust in the context of the
attorney-client relationship “directly compromise[ ] the attorney’s capacity
and inclination to introduce public values into the representation[?]”
Vischer points to the many ways in which changes in the nature of the
provision of legal services in a rapidly globalizing environment may
undermine the establishment of relational trust between lawyers and
clients. At the same time, Vischer points out that stretching lawyer-client
relationships beyond national boundaries and beyond the reach of cohesive
regulatory frameworks almost paradoxically increases the need for client
trust in lawyers.
Like the other presenters, Vischer recognizes that the problems he so
coherently identifies have no easy solutions. He points to some important
conclusions that arise from his examination of the threat to lawyer trust
posed by the rapid changes the legal profession is undergoing, and
emphasizes the need to continue to care about the legal profession’s
distinctive trust-based role, which involves more than the mere “sum of its
market-driven parts.”
Now to turn to a short general discussion of some of the themes or
qualities that unite these otherwise highly diverse presentations. First, I
find it telling to observe the extent to which each of these presentations is
deeply rooted in rigorous empirical inquiry. Each of these professional
responsibility scholars is passionately interested in the descriptive
enterprise of figuring out what is actually going on in the legal profession
today and why, and what the consequences are of their descriptive
accounts. Unlike what might have been perfectly acceptable at some point
in the past, none of these presenters is content to rely on assumptions,
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impressions, anecdotes, or bromides. Instead, all engage with actual hard
data collected by themselves or others.
Second, all of the presenters are highly theoretically sophisticated. Each
brings together new, important data with terrific theory to produce
conclusions and insights that say something important and new. Although
we made a purposeful decision to keep these papers relatively clean of
extensive footnoting, I recommend to interested readers the longer works of
each scholar on which the presentations here are based. Many years of
hard study underlie the insightful points these presenters so cogently nail.
Third and finally, a commonality that struck me, to my surprise, as I
reviewed the work on which of these presentations are based, is the way in
which each in some way tells a story that relates to the theme of classstratification in the legal profession. From Simon’s theories about how
variations among different sectors of the American bar towards increased
gatekeeping duties may be explained by structural considerations related to
relative insularity from competitive pressures; to Cummings’s tentative
conclusions about how private-sector, market-based mechanisms may be
relied on to meet some but not all public interest law needs; to Engstrom’s
gripping discoveries about how legal services are provided to the most
vulnerable and least sophisticated clients; to Vischer’s exploration of how
the rise of globalized mega-law may threaten to deeply alter the distinctive
attributes of lawyers’ role in injecting public values into clients’ decisionmaking processes, each of these presentations suggests that there are
serious but vastly different issues at stake with respect to the changing
nature of legal representation provided within disparate client sectors. The
question of whether lawyers are adequately carrying out their special duties
as public citizens professionally charged with safeguarding the workings of
justice within their legal systems, and whether they can and will continue to
do so, remains of great concern across these many client sectors, although
in very different ways depending on the particular sector examined. The
telling fact this program illuminates is that in all sectors, current trends
raise disturbing issues about lawyers’ continuing capacity to take
responsibility for safeguarding the quality of justice, and thus, highlight
pressing needs to develop and evaluate new creative solutions to these
problems. These are problems we must charge our current students with
addressing in their careers, and this program hopefully provides some
fodder for thought as we plan our professional responsibility curricula for
coming semesters.

